The assessment is publicly available and covers a four-year period. The most recent version, dated October and due to expire in October , is submitted to Home Office together with section 44 authorization requests. The MPS general equality impact assessment has scant information on section The equality impact assessment fails to engage with the potentially negative impact of section 44 powers on minority communities and their relations with the police by saying that it lacks the data to make an assessment.
Instead, it argues that such powers are necessary to prevent terrorism which it points out would affect ethnic minority and other communities. It is evident the MPS is engaged in consultation with communities in relation to stop and search powers generally, notably at borough level. Human Rights Watch understands that community impact information from the borough level is communicated to senior officers in the MPS headquarters on a regular basis.
But as the equality impact assessment suggests, it does not appear that the MPS has the same degree of engagement in relation to section 44 as it does with other stop and search powers, including in relation to preparing community impact assessments required for section 44 authorizations. Representatives from the Muslim Safety Forum and the Community Stop and Search Monitoring Network, with whom the MPS regularly consult on stop and search policy, told Human Rights Watch that they had never seen a copy of any section 44 community impact assessment nor been asked to comment on it.
Indeed, it is evident that the MPS is not submitting a fresh section 44 specific community impact assessment each month when it renews its authorisation request, as the law and guidance requires, but instead relies on its broad, and infrequently updated equality impact assessment for stop and search generally, which as noted above has little information on section Lord Carlile told Human Rights Watch that conducting a community impact assessment every four years is too long an interval. The British Transport Police is also required to submit community impact assessments when it seeks renewed authorization of its section 44 powers.
Assistant Chief Constable Pacey said that the force consults with its stop and search group composed of its National Independent Advisory Group and community representatives , and local police, and said that in several cases the BTP had decided to postpone or cancel planned operations after feedback indicated that they would have a negative impact. They are not made public. But it is important to note that pre-planned operations account for only around half of BTP stops. Ad hoc stops and searches are capable of having an equally adverse impact.
Human Rights Watch has also seen no evidence that community impact assessments have had a bearing on decisions by the force to seek renewed authorization of section 44 powers.
Section 44 power does not require individual suspicion as grounds for a stop, meaning that police officers have wide discretion as to its use. The powers are often used by ordinary police officers on the beat, rather than specialized counterterrorism officers. As a result, it is important that officers are clearly guided on its proper use. This is especially true for the MPS and BTP, since both forces are able to exercise the power widely across their jurisdictions.
Extensive guidance exists on the use section The guidance from the NPIA, MPS and BTP offer thorough and thoughtful attempts to provide clarity on the use of section 44 stop and search in a manner that is neither arbitrary, nor based on profiling. However, those attempts ultimately fail because of the contradiction inherent in the section 44 power: its goal to prevent terrorism, while allowing for people to be stopped even if they are not suspected of terrorist involvement.
Unfortunately the guidance provided at both a national and force-level fails that principle. It lacks clarity and precision, especially in relation to the most critical question for a power with no suspicion is required: how does an individual officer decide who should be stopped and searched? He replied:. This is a bit where it's very, very flaky and I won't be at all convincing, I know that, but it would be around professional judgment, what they see around the circumstances: the behaviour of the individual and the circumstances all fall together, lead them to make a judgment.
That is so flaky, you know, even I feel embarrassed saying that. But that is the truth as to what they do. Compliance with Code A is an obligation. Code A makes clear that section 44 powers should only be used for terrorism stops, and calls on officers not to discriminate. But it provides little assistance to officers in determining whom to stop. It fails to specify what other factors beyond ethnic origin might be relevant, what weight can legitimately be given to ethnic origin, and when and whether specific intelligence would be required for ethnicity to be a legitimate factor.
Moreover, the suggestion that there may be circumstances where ethnicity could be a legitimate factor in determining whether to stop someone in the absence of reasonable suspicion which would apply when the police are looking for a specific suspect and the person stopped matches the description is likely to encourage ethnic profiling.
The updated guidance is the result of a major review by the Home Office, carried out in consultation with the police and civil society organizations. The sixty-three page document contains advice on community engagement, the legal and policy framework, the authorization process, and a suggested wording for police leaflets and posters to inform the public about use of the power. The guidance tells officers to avoid profiling, and to only stop based on appearance if it is supported by evaluated intelligence.
Yet by advising officers to look at the demographic makeup of the area in which the searches are based, it effectively encourages officers to be mindful of potential disproportion in deciding whom to stop, thereby encouraging the use of ethnicity or religion as a factor even if as a negative factor, whereby an officer would determine not to stop someone because they belong to an ethnic group from whom many people had already been stopped that day.
The guidance states that stops should be based on an objective assessment. While the MPS standard operating procedures provides more detail than the NPIA guidance on selection criteria, and factors used to justify stops, it does not provide greater clarity.
While the advice not to engage in stereotyping is important, the factors set out to explain the choice of persons stopped are generally not person specific, and do not provide much help for officers wishing to avoid such stereotyping. The factors enumerated as relevant to making an objective assessment are again not person specific.
The BTP also produces its own guidance for the use of section The guidance sets out three circumstances in which the BTP will use section 44 stop and search: 1 justifiable intelligence based selection; 2 intuitive selection; and 3 proactive search operations.
Stops in the first category, based on specific intelligence, will clearly be related to characteristics particular to the individual, although the rationale for using section 44 as opposed to a power that requires reasonable suspicion such as under section 43 is not clear from the guidance.
Pancras railway station in February The third category refers to pre-planned operations, where some or all persons in a particular transport location are searched. The guidance differs from that offered by the MPS in that it aims to regulate the use of stops through limiting the operational circumstances in which a person can be stopped, rather than enumerating the factors and selection criteria used to make stops.
The guidance for using stop and search during pre-planned operations suggests that the reason for the stop is not specific to the person at all particularly where all persons are searched. While it warns officers not to conduct stops in an arbitrary manner, it fails to consider that stopping all persons at a particular location simply because they are present may itself be arbitrary.
There is a significant lack of transparency around the operation of the section 44 stop and search power, although some forces have begun to make more information publicly available. The Home Office quarterly, annual data available on the operation of police powers under the Terrorism Act , and Ministry of Justice annual data on race and the criminal justice system, all offer some insight into the operation of the section Statistics for BTP stops were not publicly available until the publication of a November Home Office statistical bulletin on the police use of counterterrorism powers.
The Metropolitan Police Service, with encouragement from its police authority, now makes a significant amount of data relating to section 44 available on its website, including its general stop and search equality impact assessment, its standard operating procedure, and borough level stop and search statistics. The City of London police also makes data available through its website, including stop and search statistics and general stop and search policy.
The British Transport Police made data available to Human Rights Watch on request, including its guidance on stop and search, and data on stops, and makes data available to its Independent Advisory Group. In June , the force published stop and search data on its website for the first time, including data on section 44 stop and search for April to March However, despite some moves to openness, other aspects of the section 44 process remain shrouded in secrecy, with many forces offering national security justifications to withhold information from the public.
Several key areas lack transparency. One is the authorization process as discussed above , with even the statutory body responsible for investigating complaints against the police unable to access information about Home Office scrutiny of authorization requests. Another area is the geographic and temporal scope of section 44 authorizations. A recent survey by the British Journal of Photography prompted by concerns about the use of section 44 and other terrorism powers against photographers, discussed in more detail below revealed the results of Freedom of Information Act requests made to 46 police forces across the UK.
While there may be operational reasons for withholding information in relation to current area and temporal authorizations, it is less clear why historic data should be routinely withheld. It may be argued that since national statistics on actual stops and searches are available, it is unimportant to have details about temporal and geographic scope of authorizations in relation to particular forces.
However, this argument ignores the fact that lack of information about whether a section 44 authorization is in place at a given time in a particular police force area, in the absence of a requirement of reasonable suspicion, makes it almost impossible for persons stopped outside London to know whether they have been stopped lawfully.
Following the positive decision by the MPS to narrow the geographic scope of its section 44 authorization, the same concern could now arise in London. Inadequate transparency in the authorization process and operation of section 44 powers is inherently problematic. That concern is further elevated when one factors in the importance of public confidence in the exercise of the policing powers; the historic criticism of the lack of openness in the exercise of stop and search powers in particular—which led to the explicit recommendation in the Macpherson Report on the need to publish data and analysis; the risks of arbitrary use inherent in the exercise of a power that requires no suspicion; and the importance of authorization as a control in those circumstances.
Being stopped and searched under section 44 stop is an intrusive process. In the year to December , the most recent month period for which statistical information is available, people were stopped more than , times, mostly in London. It is impossible to determine how many people were subject to multiple stops, but anecdotal evidence suggests that some people are indeed subject to such stops.
In many cases officers on the beat—rather than counterterrorism officers—conduct section 44 stops. Given the lack of a requirement that the person stopped is suspected of involvement in terrorism, the geographic scope of the power in London and elsewhere, and the fact that many stops are carried out by ordinary beat officers, it should come as little surprise that the section 44 power is subject to overuse, in circumstances that clearly have no connection to terrorism.
At least 14 police forces have carried out stops and searches using section 44 powers in the absence of proper authorizations. In June , Security Minister Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones gave a written ministerial statement to government ministers indicating there were at least 40 occasions where stop and search operations had been carried out without proper authorizations. In one Metropolitan Police operation in April , people were stopped in the absence of a valid authorization, with the then-home secretary failing to confirm it in 48 hours as the law requires.
In , Lord Carlile, who has access to the authorizations, identified five cases in where section 44 powers were exercised in the absence of a valid authorization. The incident took place in an unnamed part of South London in July According to a newspaper report, there were a total of 94 complaints to the IPCC about the use of section 44 in the 18 months to December Although Home Office and Ministry of Justice data on section 44 stops are not broken down by age, figures for released by the Metropolitan Police Authority suggest that section 44 stops of children are widespread in London.
According to the MPA, the Metropolitan Police in stopped searched 2, children aged 15 or under. The use of section 44 powers against protestors has caused widespread concern. As discussed, the Joint Committee on Human Rights criticized use of section 44 in the context of policing public protest, with witnesses expressing concern that the impact of its use—even if it was not its intention—was to discourage participation in protest. The Committee also cited a case of a protestor and a journalist who were stopped outside an arms fair in London.
The Gillian case was the subject of long-running litigation in the British courts, culminating in a far-reaching ruling in January by the European Court of Human Rights that the stops were unlawful, overturning earlier findings by the British courts.
Stops of photographers have also proved controversial, with MPs supporting complaints from professional and amateur photographers including tourists that their cameras and images were confiscated.
Given the nature of the power, there is a risk that it will be used by officers for purposes unconnected with terrorism, for example to carry out a search for stolen goods where the office lacks the reasonable suspicion necessary to do so. Following the introduction of the national Policing Pledge in December , which is aimed at making police more responsive to the needs of the communities they serve, forces are supposed to have moved away from the use of performance targets based on the number of stops or arrests an individual officer carries out within a certain time period.
The significant reductions in MPS and BTP stops in the second half of are tied to reductions in geographic scope of their authorizations. Liberty said : "There is a real danger that refugees and others who have fled repressive regimes to the safety of this country will become a legitimate target of the police merely because they support the overthrow of that regime, even if they themselves are opposed to violence.
Section 44 has drawn heavy criticism from protesters who claim the police have used the power to infringe the right to peaceful protest, a claim rejected by the law lords. However the use and misuse of stop and search remains controversial.
When Walter Wolfgang was forcibly removed from the audience during Jack Straw's speech to the Labour party conference, police used Section 44 powers to prevent him from returning to the conference. Liberty argues that Section 44 is too broadly drafted and that as a result it has "been abused to intimidate protesters at peaceful demonstrations which did not present a terrorist threat".
Liberty has produced a guide to understanding the powers it grants police officers. Terrorism Act An act providing 'the first permanent counter-terrorist legislation in the UK'. AIM "To make provision about terrorism ; and to make temporary provision for Northern Ireland about the prosecution and punishment of certain offences, the preservation of peace and the maintenance of order. Topics UK civil liberties liberty central UK security and counter-terrorism Counter-terrorism policy. Terrorism is the use or threat of action, both in and outside of the UK, designed to influence any international government organisation or to intimidate the public.
It must also be for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause. It is important to note that in order to be convicted of a terrorism offence a person doesn't actually have to commit what could be considered a terrorist attack.
Planning, assisting and even collecting information on how to commit terrorist acts are all crimes under British terrorism legislation.
Terrorism crimes and terrorist-related offences are subject to the criminal justice system in the same way as all other crimes. The SCCTD deals with all terrorism, war crimes and crimes against humanity, official secrets and incitement to hatred cases. In one case the trial was not concluded due to the death of the defendant and, in the remaining 9 cases, the defendant was found not guilty.
The fall is partly due to a relatively large number of arrests in the previous reporting year in the wake of terrorist attacks in London and Manchester. Although the number of arrests has fallen, it is still relatively high when compared with other recent years. Our prosecutors work closely with the police to advise on arrests and provide early investigative advice on ongoing operations.
It brings together intelligence, operations and investigations functions. Where appropriate, offences can be charged as having 'a terrorist connection'. This can lead to some confusion about whether the person convicted is deemed a terrorist as they are not charged with an offence under terrorism legislation.
Schedule 2 of Counter-Terrorism Act contains a list of offences which a judge could conclude have 'a terrorist connection'. These include charges such as murder or causing an explosion.
In all of these cases those convicted are considered terrorists, because even though they are covered by different legislation than the Terrorism Acts, the crimes committed clearly had terrorist aims. Section 30 of Counter-Terrorism Act imposes special custodial sentences for offenders of particular concern who have committed offences under Schedule 2. Certain serious violent and terrorist offenders will not be entitled to automatic release at the half way point of their sentence and will only be released early if they do not present a risk to the public.
In recent years a number of offences and powers have been designed to counter the activities of terrorists. Before their creation these had not been addressed by permanent legislation. Section 5 makes it an offence for a person to engage in the preparation of acts of terrorism, or to assist others in preparation of acts of terrorism. This includes attempts. It is an offence which requires proof that an individual had a specific intent to commit an act or acts of terrorism and can encompass a wide range of different levels of criminality, from a minor role in relation to intended acts all the way through to the planning of multiple murders.
The maximum sentence in respect of section 5 is a sentence of imprisonment for life. Further details of the specific legislation under which persons have been convicted following a charge for a terrorism-related offence can be found in data tables A. Flow chart showing outcomes following a charge of a terrorism-related offence. In the year ending 31 December , there were 48 people charged with a terrorism-related offence.
Of these, 22 were prosecuted, 23 are awaiting prosecution, 2 were not proceeded against and 1 received another outcome. Of the 22 prosecutions, 20 led to convictions and two were found not guilty.
All 20 convictions were for terrorism-related offences. This section provides more detail on the demographic and other characteristics of persons arrested.
It includes data on:. As in previous years, and similar to other types of crime, the vast majority of those arrested for terrorism-related activity were males. This was a fall of 12 arrests compared with previous month period, and the lowest proportion of females arrested since the year ending December The total number of females arrested was under the annual average arrested 24 over the entire time series.
While this was the highest proportion seen in an annual period, it was largely a result of falls in arrests of those in older age-groups. Figures in this section are based on the ethnic appearance of the arrestee as recorded by the arresting officer. There were falls in the number of arrests across all ethnic groups when compared with the previous year.
The proportion of White people arrested exceeded the proportion of Asian people arrested for the third consecutive year. Proportion of persons arrested for terrorist-related activity by ethnic appearance, year ending 31 December and 31 December , compared with total proportions since 11 September Table 2.
This section presents statistics on prosecutions for terrorism-related offences in England and Wales. It provides data on the number of persons prosecuted and convicted, including information on the legislation under which they were prosecuted. It also provides information on the length and type of sentence that each convicted person received. Data in this section are based on the trial completion date and are not directly comparable to the prosecutions data in section 2, Arrests and outcomes, which is based on the date of arrest.
The data cover terrorism-related court cases that were completed in the 11 years from the year ending December up to the year ending December This peak in court proceedings in the year ending December followed on from the highest volume of terrorism-related arrests in that year as discussed in chapter 2. During , there has been an increase in the overall backlog of court cases, due to COVID [footnote 2]. However, the number of persons proceeded against by the Crown Prosecution Service for terrorism-related offences has remained fairly consistent during this period, reflecting that these more serious offences have been prioritised.
Of the 54 persons tried for terrorism-related offences, 49 were convicted. Figure 3. Flow chart showing outcome of terrorism-related trials. Of the 49 persons tried for TACT offences, 45 were convicted and 4 were acquitted. Of the 5 persons tried for non-TACT offences, 4 were convicted and 1 was acquitted.
There was 1 sentence of 10 years or more, a decrease of 5 compared with the previous year. The number of non-custodial sentences increased from 1 to 7 in the latest year.
Although this is a large change from the previous year, this sentence type made up a similar proportion of sentences as in There was also 1 hospital order in the latest year, the same as the previous year. Graph showing sentence length by number of convictions, for year ending December and year ending December Statistics presented in this section give information on the number of persons in custody for terrorism-connected offences in Great Britain.
This includes both those that had been convicted and those being held on remand that is, held in custody until a later date when a trial or sentencing hearing will take place. This section includes breakdowns of their ethnicity, nationality, ideology and religion. Prior to June , the Home Office published figures on both terrorist prisoners and domestic extremist or separatist prisoners.
This was to remove the previous subjectivity around the categorisation of domestic extremist prisoners. For this reason, figures for September onwards are not directly comparable with previous years or quarters. That determination may only be made by the sentencing court in accordance with Part 3 of the Counter-Terrorism Act and only after consideration of the requirements specified in that Act.
Data on the number of prisoners released cover the 9 quarters to 30 September Prisoner release figures up to 31 December are not yet available as these will form a subset of the prison releases statistics which will be published by the Ministry of Justice in their Offender management statistics quarterly release in April As at 31 December , there were persons in custody for terrorism-connected offences in Great Britain.
A total of 42 terrorist prisoners were released from custody in Great Britain in the latest year for which figures were available year ending 30 September [footnote 3]. This figure includes 30 terrorism-related offenders related between October and June and 12 terrorism-connected offenders released between July and September Of the 42 released from custody, 16 had received sentences of less than 4 years, and 15 had sentences of 4 years or more including one life sentence.
No one was released following an indeterminate sentence for public protection. Eleven people had been convicted but not yet been sentenced. This section presents statistics on the use of stop and search powers available to the police under the Terrorism Act TACT
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